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-I. I. -
PROCEDURES AND PROFESSIONALISM and/versus PARTICIPATION
AND POPULAR ORGANISATION: Some Problems of Accountability
and Community Action
by
Reginald Herbold Green
The development of Tanzania will come from the
decisions of village and urban governments and from
thousands of local groups which decide to help them-
selves in development and take the actions necessary
to do so.
President J.K. Nyerere
"A Time of Struggle," National
Assembly, 1980.
If the people are to develop, they must have power.
They must be able to control their own activities within
the framework of their... communities .... At present
the best intentioned governments--my own included--
too readily move from a conviction of the need for
rural development into acting as if the people had no
ideas of their own. This is quite wrong--people do
know what their basic needs are.. . if they have suffi -
cient freedom they can be relied upon to determine
their own priorities of development.
President Nyerere, Opening
Address World Conference on
Agrarian Reform, 1979.
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1.
Introductory Ground Clearing
Four major difficulties arise in surveys of tensions and interactions
between popular organisation and action on the one hand and procedures and
professionalism on the other:
1. there is no standard terminology and the frequent use of terms as
banners is "analytically confusing and often socio -politically mysti-
fying;
2. what forms of interaction are likely/possible/desirable depends
on the context; and depends, it is necessary to stress, in complex
ways. The plausible courses of action of an organisation of poor
villagers in Maharastra, West Bengal, Lucon, Mindanao, Central
Kikuyu, the Northwest Frontier District, Mbulu District and
Iringa Region are each quite different because the contexts differ
-- not only between India the Philippines, Kenya and Tanzania,
but within each of them;Y
3. perceptions of the value of procedures, professionalism,
participation and popular organisation depend both on the context
and on the perceivers' position in that context--in ways which are
not always easy to deduce. A senior civil servant, for example,
may feel much less threatened by popular organisation and/or
participation than a field level junior officer even if their class
background and income levels would at first glance suggest the
reverse. Professionals are often prone to attack the restrictive
practices and procedural priorities of other professions, but not
their own; 2
4. no one observer has an adequate array of direct experience
across contexts (and from different positions) to do a taxonomic
survey or a synthesis of case studies, which would provide use-
ful rules about these interactions; 3
The balance of this paper will therefore concentrate on:
a. considering what meaning can be placed on participation,
professionalism, procedures, and popular organisation;
b. certain interactions and tensions among those concepts, and
some of their implications for accountability;
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c. some of the actual and potential roles of law, laws and lawyers in
these interactions and notes on possible action by professionals
(especially lawyers) concerned with furthering accountability
through popular organisation and participation.
II.
Participation: In What? How?
In a paper oriented toward popular organisation, community action and
accountability it is presumably unnecessary to state a case for participation.
Indeed part of the problem with using the term is the. wide range of meanings
appended to it. Even elitist technocrats now find it desirable to call vocifer-
ously for participation as opposed to (or as a more acceptable means of?)
demanding discipline and coercion of "lazy, ignorant, stubborn" workers and
peasants. Unfortunately, in many of these cases, the use of the term "par-
ticipation" is not pure hypocrisy--the user has a genuine concept in mind
which does enF'airl some elements of participation but which is not the concept
of participation stressed in the context of "another development" 4 or "basic
human needs." 5
What is needed is a working definition setting out certain aspects of
participation. First, participation includes taking part in decision taking
(either by proposing and commenting on proposed action in a way that actually
does influence the decision or by being represented on the decision -taking
body in more than a formal sense). Second, it includes taking part in actions
to carry out the decisions by the (non-managerial) participants, normally
with at least some freedom for self -organisation and adjustment of the
process. Third, it comprises inclusion in, as well as power to initiate,
review and appraisal both of implementation and of decisions feeding back
into the first stage of decision taking when review shows the need for altered
and further decisions.
However, participation is not somehow rendered invalid if it is in
response to an external stimulus. The Tanzania Coffee Authority takes
Village Council Members from Kagera Region (where coffee trees are not
pruned or fertilized or treated against disease) to see peasant practice in
Kilimanjaro Region (where coffee bushes are pruned, mulched and treated
against diseases). On their return some do advise their Councils to under-
take programmes to change cultivation practices and to set an example in
their own coffee groves. This does appear to be participation even though
the impetus in one sense comes from TCA. Certainly many initiatives will
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come from members of a popular organisation, but again usually because
one or a few members have the combination of knowledge, experience and
conceptualizing ability to suggest something new; e.g., there is a high
correlation between Development Villages operating one or two lorries and/
or buses (usually to serve villages en route to their basic destination as well
as themselves) and those with a former commercial driver or mechanic on
the Village Council. 6
Participation can operate at varied levels. True, if there is none in the
basic community and workplace (e.g., village, neighbourhood, factory,
office), then the "higher level" (broader community) participation may be
suspect. But not all problems can be handled only or even dominantly at
community levels. Further, innovation and initiative do need some frame-
work to preserve an acceptable degree of coherence. For example, full
worker determination of wages in each office or factory separately could
hardly be expected to add up to a coherent or equitable wages and salaries'
policy at the national level. Further, there are conflicts among nationalities
and interests. For example, in areas in which boreholes are the only prac-
ticable source of water, sequences taking into account the urgency of village
needs and the feasible routings to keep expensive, scarce equipment busy
drilling (and not travelling back and forth) must be agreed upon if substantial
loss of potential additional pure water points is to be avoided. And in the
case above a national income distribution policy can only be coherent and
equitable if there is a national framework. The primary way to participation
is to ensure that directly or indirectly basic communities and popular organ-
isations are involved in the basic decisions and, if possible, in key conse-
quential decisions setting wages and grower prices. 7
The broader levels of participation can only function by representation.
A village can meet for key decisions, but needs somebody chosen by it to
articulate and oversee implementation. A region (say 1,000,000 persons)
cannot have effective decision taking and review participation except by
representative bodies and by decision taker consultation with basic commu-
nities and/or some members thereof. The case for indirect participation is
not an abstract one but a technical necessity related to numbers and distances.
In other instances it also relates to the knowledge needed to act effectively in
certain second level (articulation) decisions. Workers and peasants have
every reason to insist on participation in deciding policies about foreign ex-
change generation and foreign investment. Typical workers and peasants
cannot literally take part in the technical analysis of how to use natural gas
for chemicals, how to link with technology-marketing-finance, ways of nego-
tiating a viable contractual package. That requires professionals with spe-
cialized skills operating in a frame set by the basic participatory decisions
and with technical advice/decisions subject to review (before implementa-
tion), e.g., political bodies which are at least indirectly participatory.
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Ill.
Professionalism and Professionals
A professional--for present purposes--is a person with specialized
knowledge about, and applicable to, dealing with a particular range of
topics. Professionalism is the use of such expert knowledge, whether as an
individual proprietor and employee or a member of a "community" of pro-
fessionals.
On the fact of it, professionals and 9 rofessionalism should increase
efficiency toward almost any set of ends -- including participation and pop-
ular organisation. However, reality is much more problematic. Several
reasons underlie this problematic relationship:
A. Professional knowledge is often inaccessible to "outsiders" (not
just the poor!) until translated in whole or in part. Professionals
tend to resist translation and to suspect simplified presentations
do more harm than good. (But when convinced that popular under-
standing and paraprofessional training are needed and when willing
to interact with non-professionals to seek insights into needs and
capacities, professionals can not only transmit but transfer com-
mand over much (not all) professional knowledge and procedures.
Each case of successful development of "paramedical" based
mass primary health care has had a core of highly qualified pro-
fessionals as one integral component.)
B. Professionals have a tendency to see themselves as Platonic
Guardians (and view "their" area of expertise as the center of
knowledge and action). 9 This leads to a built-in tendency toward
authoritarianism and against participation in decision taking--
especially by individuals or groups less powerful than the profes -
sionals. 10 (However, this attitude can be useful to popular organi-
sation if, from the professionals' stance, it is the bureaucrats or
the exploiters who are stupid.)
C. Professions and most professionals seek to protect their own
interests. Exclusiveness and limiting paraprofessionalism are
key instruments. Professions tend--as one aspect--to be trade
unions of the relatively well off (cartels in restraint of competi-
tion). (Per contra, some professions (law and medicine are
examples) have, and many professionals act on, a tradition of
providing free or reduced cost services to poor individuals or
groups. )11
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D. Professionals can be remarkably unworldly: in its 1979 World
Development Report the World Bank treats Asian urban services
inequities as basically muddled inefficiency without ever asking
(let alone saying) who profits from (and therefore perpetuates)
them.
E. Professional services are easier for the rich and powerful to
acquire than for the poor and for popular organisations. This is
especially true if and where (e. g., most of the rural Third World)
there are relatively few independent practitioners, and physical
availability as well as financial costs become constraints. (The
tradition of voluntary service is a partial corrective but hardly an
adequate one.)
The word problematic is chosen deliberately. In several of the areas of
potential conflict there is also a potential for alliance, and in none is there
likely to be a total antagonistic contradiction between all members of any
profession12 and poor individuals/popular organisations. What can be done
to develop positive interaction is a critical question, both for popular organ-
isations and for concerned professionals. That, too, is problematic since
outlooks of superiority and suspicion (even if subliminal), and the real
dangers of overpersuasion or confusion, are usually present.
IV.
Process, Procedures and Proceeding
Procedures are necessary. Equally they always run the danger of being
self-defeating. This is as true for popular organisations and for innovations
arising from spontaneity as for the rule of law and a system of legal advo-
cacy.
The proper purpose of procedures is to facilitate proceeding. 13
Proceeding to what depends on who designed the procedures, why and who
operates them how. They may facilitate a process (or hamper it), and it
may or may not be the intended process.
For example, in Liberia land registration on a freehold roll applied to
all land within a given distance of made-up roads and was awarded to the first
applicant after the road was decided upon. The effect was to allow the elite
(notably the late President's family) to secure land at the expense of the prior
users who had held it under "tribal" tenure which became invalid at the point
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of the road decision. This procedure worked well in the sense that it
facilitated the process its authors intended.
Per contra: Tanzanian rent control legislation procedures are not very
effective. The tribunals to set rents must meet on individual cases. To
operate at all they must operate ward by ward. As there are few, the gap
between determinations and between a new building's completion and coming
under control can be long. The old 140 of initial cost maximum rent rule is
also procedurally dubious as on over 10-15 year-old buildings the rent often
does not cover proper maintenance and repair plus insurance. The honest
landlord (e. g., public corporations) either cannot afford to keep his buildings
up, and/or cannot build more to meet real demand and/or operates at a loss.
The dishonest can often avoid a determined rent and still oftener can demand
"under the counter" cash payments subject to no contractual safeguards (nor
to income tax). 14 The degree of protection for tenants and of viability for
honest landlords is uneven and problematic despite the procedures.
Procedures are necessary to organize sequences and to keep track of
each case. To handle hundreds of parallel transactions on a spontaneous,
ad hoc, non-sequential basis is slower (given the number of people working
i the-m) and almost certain to produce total inconsistency in outcomes.
Bureaucratisation--in the strict, Weberian sense--is essential if a large
number of case decisions are to be taken speedily and consistently. Further,
procedures can--if clear to the outside user- -enable him to know exactly
what he must do to achieve a given result.
However, procedures can--wilfully or otherwise--block out would-be
clients who do not understand them (creating a bias in favour of the edu-
cated, the physically close and those who share a common culture or class
with the bureaucrats). For example, to a medium-sized urban shopkeeper
the Tanzania Trade Licensing Act procedures are intelligible and practi-
cable--except for the Party scrutiny which may reject him on grounds he
does not comprehend. But to a Development Village Shop the procedures are
hard to learn of or to follow--except for the Party branch role which becomes
a means of access to knowledge and correct form filling.
Procedures can also be abused to favour individual cases without this
being evident. For example, Land Registration in Tanzania is rather cum-
bersome with a variety of forms and stages. Because this results in uneven
time for registration it is all too easy for a bribe to be demanded/offered to
speed up the process (or pressure applied on the bureaucrat to take a
favoured application out of the waiting list). Here pathology in the procedure
worsens its results. If--as in principle could be the case within the proce-
dures--three months was the average waiting time (not two to three years),
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there would be less incentive to seek special treatment and less opportunity
to disguise acceleration or delay related to extortion.
In principle, therefore, speed, participation and acceptability can be
facilitated by procedures. What procedures depends on how routine and how
common the type of decision/action is and at how "high" a level action is
needed. Further, whether a procedure facilitates participation or not de-
pends on its intelligibility, whether it facilitates access to the proceeding,
the intent of the procedure framers and the present governing coalition, and
the ways bureaucrats operate it. By and large acceptability will depend on
whether to an onlooker the procedure seems intelligible, speedy, open in and
productive of results which appear to him both consistent and equitable.
Needless to say, an engrossing landlord and a threatened peasant could have
very different perceptions of the acceptability of the same procedure!
Procedures are rarely value or class neutral. Unequal knowledge alone
guarantees that. So does the fact that procedures usually are designed to
further some process which is also neither value nor class neutral. Finally,
the way they are used -- whether by bureaucrats operating them or by unin -
tended or unforeseen potential beneficiaries 5 -- alters their objective mean-
ing in equally non-neutral ways. The neutrality or equality of procedures at
most applies to identical decisions on identical cases. Even that can be
achieved only if the operators are honest and understand the procedures and
all "clients" are actually able to (or can secure adequate advice on how to)
interact with the procedural process. In practice anyone who is poor, unedu-
cated and isolated is likely to face handicaps and to be made worse off by
apparently neutral procedures, even those intended to operate legislation
enacted to serve his interests. The case of low-income housing / squatter
programmes is replete with examples of the latter.
V.
Popular Organisations: Notes on Tupes, Strategies, Tactics
Popular organisations in the context of participation and accountability
can be defined as organisations whose basic membership and leadership is
made up of workers and peasants. Organisations genuinely in solidarity with
them whose basic membership and leadership consists of professionals
managers, officials, politicians, can best be seen as support groups. id
The structure of popular organisations--like their activities--varies
widely. Logically there should be a base of direct membership, primary
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community units. There may or may not be superstructures of district,
regional or national organisations (or de facto superstructures of alliances
with other popular organisations not constituting a formal organisational
level). A superstructure only body is less likely to be a true popular organ-
isation because the chances for broad, direct participation are minimal as
are the opportunities for self-initiated, self -carried -out action. Certainly
acting as a pressure group is one of the common roles of a popular organi-
sation (sometimes the initial one) but it is probably not a satisfactory long-
term single role. 17
Popular organisations seem to fall into four clusters depending on the
context in which they exist and how they relate to local or national power
structures:
a. basically anti-state or anti-system organisations. These are
often illegal but may be tolerated so long as they concentrate on
activities not directly threatening key interests of power holders,
or the power holders they do threaten have enemies within the
decision-taking coalition who--up to a point--protect the popular
organisation for tactical reasons;
b. radical reformist organisations which do not overtly (and
probably not consciously) seek the overthrow of the state or
system but do seek such far-reaching structural changes that the
success of their programme would de facto constitute a revolu-
tion. These may operate in intersfices or may be tolarated as
channels for reducing tension, but may also be suppressed, in
which case over time they--or a fraction of their membership--
are likely to transform themselves into anti -state/anti -system
groups;
c. main-line reformist organisations which do seek substantial
changes but ones, at least in principle, attainable within the
existing system because they would not require overturning its
basic power structures. These may be tolerated or even backed
by the power structure or some elements within it. However,
those directly threatened by them will seek to co-opt support for
hampering or suppressing them from stronger elements of the
decision-taking group on the grounds of sub-class coalition
solidarity, and often succeed;
d. popular organisations squarely within the system either because
the system (or some key fraction of the decision-taking group) is
committed to popular organisation or participation, because the
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organisation (i. e., its leadership and many of its members) has
an inaccurate consciousness of the nature of the system or be-
cause it has been co-opted. These are normally backed, "guided,"
co-opted or transformed into puppets. 18
One cannot locate an organisation on this spectrum simply in terms of
its own goals--one must also know the systemic context. Peasant and
squatter organisations on the borderline between a and b in most of India
could well be in the main-line reformist or even within the system clusters
in West Bengal or Kerala. Nor is the location of a group constant over time.
The system may change; e.g., peasant and workers' organisations in prin-
ciple within the system in President Allende's Chile are (to the extent they
still exist) very much anti-system in Caudillo Pinochet's Chile. Alterna-
tively, systemic perceptions of the body or vice versa may change. Most
Southern African liberation movements began as main-line reformist and
were driven by a combination of systemic repression and higher conscious-
ness of the system to an anti-system/anti-state stance. Finally, while the
four-cluster typology is of use, the actual position is a spectrum with many
organisations on the a/b and c/d borderlines and with substantial differenti-
ation within clusters.
Strategies relate to types. An anti-government organisation may seek
a New Heaven and a New Earth (e. g., African branches of Watchtower Move-
ment) or a rather more operationally outlined new system to be achieved by
violence and/or negotiation (e.g., SWAPO of Namibia). A radical reformist
organisation might in practice seek the second but would overtly normally
seek far-reaching changes within the system and seek to rely on existing
formal, legal provisions (e.g., Bhoomi Sena--in Maharastra). A main-line
reformist organisation's strategy may be in terms of limited structural
changes and/or of making the system work more effectively--a combination
likely to feature in the strategy of within the system popular organisations
(e. g., the TAPA, the parent's organisation for education associated with the
Part in Tanzania).
Tactics flow from strategy--albeit apparent mismatches are not
infrequent; e. g., writing letters to magistrates in the pockets of landlords
to ask that the landlords and/or their hired thugs be arrested for extortion
and violence. The range is from systematic violence through direct action
to amicable discussion and on to reasonably amicable dialogue with decision
takers and participation in decision-taking bodies. Within tactics are a
separate sub-division relating to those things an organisation does itself for
its members; e.g., credit schemes, food stocks, particular projects which
are not one-to-one correlated either with external tactics or with type of
organisation.
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For the outsider--unless he is in solidarity with the popular organisation
as perceived by its leadership and membership--identifying strategy and the
details of tactics is difficult. Popular organisations often do not have for-
mally defined, long-term strategies and depend on responsive innovation and
specific consensuses to determine tactics on a case-by-case basis. More
generally they have a shrewd grasp of the facts that knowledge can be power
and that to provide knowledge to outsiders can often be damaging even if the
outsider is personally well intentioned; e.g., an anti-government organisa-
tion that explained strategy, tactics and structure in detail to a radical
academician who promptly published it in an article supporting the organi-
sation would be almost as much at risk as one which provided the same data
to an individual who objectively was a police spy.
VI.
Information, Initiative, Involvement, Sanctions: Inputs to Accountability
A principle linked to concepts of participation and "another development"
in particular and to democracy (bourgeois or socialist) more generally is that
of accountability. A series of questions arise: by whom to whom? Over what
range of issues is accountability appropriate? What are the basic components
of a workable system of accountability?
The broad answer to the first question is by anyone responsible for
taking or implementing decisions on behalf of others -- particularly to those
who placed him in that position but equally to those significantly affected by
his decisions. A catch in this is that accountability may mean different
things to differently affected groups in terms of acceptability, or in terms of
acting within the limits of law, procedure and policy.
For what in particular should one be accountable can be a hotly debated
question. At the one extreme there is little argument that in a parliamentary
system the members are accountable to the electorate for the laws that they
pass and that these must be published. At the other it is rarely seriously
argued that during a war field officers should be directly responsible to the
public for their decisions within the accepted scope under the "laws of war." 19
In between these are real divergences of opinion. Some information (much
less than secrecy proponents claim but not more) cannot be disclosed without
injuring those to whom the person/organisation is accountable, or injuring
innocent bystanders. Other compelled disclosures may encourage avoidance
of decisions.
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The third question--what are the elements of accountability -- may be
the most critical to examine. The first element is information. No person
or organisation can effectively be held accountable by any person or organi-
sation who lacks information on what it has decided or done. Accountability
as an integral element in a system requires rather detailed, compulsory,
routinized disclosure with backing provisions for securing additional data or
checking what has been provided if there is reason to suspect serious incom-
pleteness or inaccuracy. 20
A second element is initiative. To be able to hold to account an
individual or organisation must be able to raise proposals for action (and
then have the right to inquire what has become of them and why), to call for
explanation and review of decisions, to seek analysis and (if appropriate)
correction of the process and results of implementation. Accountability
which is purely at the instance of those accountable rests on rather shaky
foundations; its coverage and continuity are never assured.
An equally vital element is involvement in decision taking, the progress
of action and review. The completeness of and ability to comprehend infor-
mation and the ability to take initiatives are at best limited and at worst
stultified if there is no involvement. In practice involvement (like partici-
pation) must often be by representatives and/or indirect; e.g., a worker or
peasant co-opt director on a Central Bank Board is practicable and poten-
tially useful, all workers and peasants in the policy committee is neither.
Finally, accountability rests on sanctions in two senses: when an
individual or institution defies the other elements of accountability; when
the accountability process shows evidence of improper action. Without
sanctions the process is voluntary and usually at best incompletely, unevenly
and episodically effective.
What sanctions are appropriate to what actions under what circum-
stances is very much a contextual question. So is the actual and/or desir-
able balance and interaction among administrative and legal, direction
action, political or revolutionary sanctions.
VII.
What Is The Law?
At one level the question "What is the Law about participation, popular
organisations and accountability?" is absurd. There is no general answer
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for different states and even within most (all?) states. Indeed at some
levels - -e. g., those of sanctions - -generalisations about laws tend to be
platitudinous, uninformative and misleading.
However, law is an organizing framework. In that role it does (or
should) be consistent in any one state at any one time at least at the level of
general interpretation and application. In that context it makes sense to
inquire whether as now written and/or as applied in country X, law is gen-
erally conducive, limiting, or hostile to participation, popular organisations
and accountability.
The law is made up of the body of individual laws (and their interpre-
tation/application). These determine specific issues--and may be rather
inconsistent either by mistake or because decision takers intend, e.g., to
make private employers accountable to workers but not public enterprises
to peasants (the apparent case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
the late 1960s and early 1970s and to a lesser extent today).
In summary--and with many exceptions--Third World law/laws can be
said to:
1. be relatively vague or even silent on accountability, especially to
employees, users, recipients;
2. provide for certain types of participation but not, in most cases,
those most applicable to popular organisations;
3. place severe limits on popular organisations whether intention-
ally or by failing to deal with them separately from business
organisations or political parties;
4. have very wide divergences between form and practice--in both
directions. For example, participation and accountability in
Tanzania is only partially underpinned by law or even by clear
administrative regulations, and certain de facto accepted forms
of direct action used in it are palpably ifFegal under existing
statutes, while a good deal of Philippine statute law is much
more participation, accountability and popular organisation-
oriented than actual practice;
5. these discrepancies spring partly from hypocrisy, partly from
attempts to assuage some groups (internal and external) with
form and others with practice, some from the lag between
socio-political change and its legal ratification.
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In practice legal action is rarely a primary instrument for gaining new
rights in respect to participation, accountability, popular organisation. It
may on occasion serve to enforce formal rights which have been system-
atically honoured in the breach. More generally if the form of the law is
more favourable than the practice, attempted legal action can be a potent
mobilizing instrument even if the actual gains turn on using quite different
means subsequently (a fairly common pattern in both Indian rural popular
organisations and those of northern Latin America).
Once participation/popular organis ation /accountability have been
advanced by other means, law (and formal, published administrative regu-
lations which are often its paralegal sibling) is important to incorporate the
advances into the "published" socio-political order, to lay down processes -
procedures - limits, to set up dispute resolution methods (including consul-
tation, mediation, arbitration, special tribunals as well as normal access
to courts), to provide sanctions against violations of what has been achieved.
The role of the legal profession has been problematic. As a whole
lawyers are concerned that they are able to participate, to call to account
those whose decisions directly affect themselves, to organize their own pro-
fession autonomously. It would be unwise and inaccurate from this to see
all- -or even a majority of- -lawyers as dedicated to participation, popular
organisation and accountability (especially by themselves to outsiders!) as
general social organizing principles. The record is very mixed. In cases
of repression (including repression of lawyers) the profession may well take
a lead in organizing resistance and play an important role in a popular coali-
tion (e. g., Ghana under Acheampang) but if lawyers themselves are not
repressed a majority are very likely to identify with the ruling decision-
taking group.
Indeed it would also be unfair to say most lawyers are deeply opposed
to participation, popular organisation and accountability as organizing prin-
ciples. Most have not, in fact, considered or became involved in the ques-
tion in any serious way.
In most countries some lawyers--perhaps particularly some law
faculty members but on occasion also some independent practitioners22 -
are committed to these principles and act on them. The most common way
is by taking individual cases (e.g., the majority of--now decimated--group
"black defence lawyers" in South Africa). This is partly because that
approach is consonant with a lawyer's normal mode of operation, partly
because a lawyer usually wants to believe there is a remedy at law for
gross injustice, partly because such a course ofaction allows a protective
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colouration of "professional duty to provide counsel" for words and actions
which would otherwise invite punitive action. In a deeply repressive system
(e. g., South Africa) this approach certainly does not cause systematic change
for the better. It may radicalise lawyers, clients and observers by demon-
strating that the system is oppressive and that the existing law and laws are
its instruments. It certainly can rescue some rights and some individuals at
least for a time. (The evolution of oppression in South Africa is marked by a
host of individual legal victories hastily reversed by new laws and regula-
tions.) Where the case-by-case approach is most effective is in systems in
which individuals violate rights without the knowledge or without the con-
sidered sanction of the senior decision takers; the particular cases may
focus attention on general problems leading to reforms broader than the case
at hand (e.g., possibly the 1977 -80 habeas corpus cases in respect to a
variety of types of unlawful detention in Tanzania).
Acting as counsel to a popular organisation, advising such a body,
becoming a member of a solidarity group with a popular organisation, becom-
ing a member and attempting to help such a body develop its own administra-
tive/constitutional procedures or to set up a parallel extralegal or illegal
adjudication and sanctioning system, are less common, more or less in that
order. They are not, however, unknown.
The role of popular organisation law has not been widely and
systematically explored. It includes parallel legal systems--whether extra
or illegal 2 3 -- which seem to have substantial importance in some contexts.
It also includes internal constitutional, administrative, structural codes,
documents, formulations; an aspect on which lawyers appear to have done
virtually no work although it is logically allied to the more standard areas of
constitutional and administrative law. Presumptively, the adequacy and
appropriateness (or otherwise) of these aspects significantly affect the
effeztiveness of popular organisations.
VIII.
Tensions and Contradictions: Antagonistic and Otherwise
By and large there is opposition by the included, exploiters (active or
passive) and oppressers (or beneficiaries of oppression) to attempts by the
excluded, exploited and oppressed to achieve participation, popular organi-
sation and accountability. However, there are always individual exceptions
-- objectively "class traitors" 2 4 or converts. There may also be class or
sub-class exceptions -- arguably some "petty bourgois" groups (e. g.,
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intellectuals, civil servants, salaried managers, professionals) tend to ally
themselves with (and to be accepted as at least subordinate members of)
almost any dominant decision-taking coalition including a popular organisa-
tion -based one.
Equally in any actual system there will be tensions. Popular
organisation autonomy is not free of conflict with accountability nor are the
interests of all popular organisations consistent. Procedures and profes-
sionalism have critical roles to play but the appropriate balance between
them and participation, accountability, innovation and popular organisation
is always problematic, always changing and usually widely divergent from
case to case at any one time.
What these tensions are, how seriously they threaten the system and
whether they can be creative is not answerable in the abstract. One needs
an actual objective correlative at national institutional, local community or
organisational level.
Similarly, whether there are contradictions which run deeper than
tensions, whether these are basic and whether they are antagonistic (sol-
uble only by power reversal or--less commonly in practice--a new system)
again can be answered only in respect to a concrete context. In the cases of
South Africa, occupied Namibia, Zaire, El Salvador or Afghanistan, the
answer to each question is clearly, yes. In the cases of the Philippines or
Kenya the first two questions must be answered yes, but the last is at least
slightly (if apparently decreasingly) open. In the cases of Sri Lanka and
Nicaragua both the second and third questions are open. In that of Tanzania
an answer to the third question is fairly clearly no (at least at present) and
that to the second arguably no, even though that to the first is clearly yes. 25
IX
What Is To Be Done?
What can or should be done to further participation, accountability or
popular organisation is again a contextual question. In a sense it is answer-
able in ways analogous to the discussion of types, strategies and tactics of
popular organisations discussed in Section V above.
To seek to make the Tanzanian system more efficient in those aspects
which are in principle and partially in practice consistent with participation,
accountability and popular organisation, to seek adequate codification of
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these elements in laws and in administrative regulations, to fight court
cases against specific abuses, to call attention to inconsistencies between
principle and practice and to tackle piece by piece, step by step, and insti.-
tution by institution the hierarchy/partcipation contradiction is arguably a
correct action agenda in that context. Until 1977 it might have been
equally appropriate to Sri Lanka. The increasing antagonism in the Sinhala/
Tamil contradiction and the distinct tendencies toward exclusion, authori-
tarianism and repression by the present government (uniquely high by Sri
Lankan standards even if probably uniquely low on South or Southeast Asian
regional comparisons) suggest it is no longer adequate--action to bridge the
communal gulf, to protect popular organisations (of workers and of peasants)
and to create effective resistance to creeping authoritarianism/repression
now need to be added.
In the case of the Philippines or in that of Kenya more than simple
additions are needed. Not only are the present trends in the "wrong" direc-
tion, the base levels of participation, popular organisation and accountability
are qualitatively lower (albeit by no means non-existent) and the commitment
of the leadership to sustaining them in grave doubt (to put it as mildly as
possible). One is not seeking to advance within a dynamic, nor, primarily,
to protect past gains, but to hold what exists against an adverse trend and to
create a forward dynamic. Reasonable people and organisations are likely to
differ very widely on the appropriate mix of main-line reform, radical re-
form, direct action/confrontation short of revolution and revolution. 27
In South Africa there is again a need for a qualitatively different
strategy. By the system's own definition that strategy must be inherently
unlawful and basically revolutionary. That is not to say it may not include
elements of negotiation (probably only effective after much more antagonistic
confrontations), use of the courts for specific purposes, working via legal or
quasi legal institutions (e. g., the South African Council of Churches, some
of the Soweto Committees, conceivably some of Inkatha's constituent organi-
sations) 2 8 either to raise consciousness by building on limited initial activi-
ties or by exposing the nature of the system by seeking to enter into genuine
dialogue with it, and similar tactics. But to perceive these as even poten-
tially central is almost certainly a grave mistake. 2 9
Even within each country there are sharp divergences. The position of
women and ethnic minorities and of squatters/landless labourers is usaually
significantly worse than that of other groups. It is worth remembering that
the Golden Age of Athenian Democracy applied fully to the 5% who were male
citizens, indirectly to a degree to the 5% female citizens, in certain rights
and legal remedies (but not accountability or participation) to the ten to 15%
who were free non citizens and not at all to the 75 to 80% who were not of
free status.
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X.
Roles for Lawyers and Professionals More Generally
In detail the roles of professionals in general and lawyers in
particular must depend on what is to be done and therefore on the context.
However, a number of more general points can be made which have at least
some applicability in most contexts:
1. provide professional services (preferably free or at most at
minimum cost) to popular and solidarity organisations and to
individuals within them. These bodies do need access to
specialized knowledge and are usually well aware of that need
and willing to explore how they might acquire it;
2. define professional services more broadly than normal to
include advice on how to proceed in any area in which the pro-
fessional feels competent and, perhaps more important, seek
to devise ways in which the organisation can acquire control
over professional skills within itself--at least to paraprofes-
sional and potentially to professional level;
3. act in solidarity with popular organisations (whether individ-
ually or through solidarity organisations) on the basis of
dialogue and of playing a complementary, supporting not a
dominant, determining role. This does not rule out criticism
or suggestion; it does countermand attempted imposition of
new tactics, goods or levels of consciousness. 30
4. join popular organisations as individual members.
There is a rather limited variant of the third element which is common
-- to act in what is believed to be the interests of popular organisations or the
poor and the excluded without actually attempting to find out how they perceive
those interests. That approach has on occasion produced successes and
doubtless will do so again. But it is not very participatory nor does it stand
up well to any test of accountability. Further, it runs a grave risk of pro-
ceeding either in the wrong direction, with the wrong priorities or in the
wrong sequence from the point of view of the intended beneficiaries. What
process of interaction is necessary/appropriate/possible is a contextual
issue. Formal meetings of executives, opinion polls, ballots, etc., are
neither regularly necessary, always appropriate nor universally possible.
The test is whether a high degree of mutual communication, a mutual feeling
of solidarity and at least some elements of participation and accountability
are achieved.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In West Bengal the state government is radical and poor peasant
oriented but not in Maharastra. In Luzon the struggle is farily straight-
forward peasant vs. landlord/merchant but in Mindanoa colonised hill
tribes vs. colonizing Luzoners vs. colonizing Southern Moslems vs.
colonizing TNCs interact in a much more complex way. In the North-
west Frontier District the people are dominantly of communities with
little influence on and viewed with hostility by the governing elite,
whereas the reverse holds in Kikuyu. In Mbula district land is not
scarce and rich peasants' success has not in fact been at the expense of
small villages, whereas before villagisation the reverse pertained in
parts of Iringa.
The author's position has usually been that of a semi-detached observer
either as an academician or a professional adviser rather outside line
bureaucracy.
3. The bulk of the author's direct observation is from a decade in Tanzania.
The balance is scattered among a score of African and Asian countries,
while second hand (reading, discussion) data is also largely Afro-Asian
and rather peripherally Latin American or industrial economy.
4. Cf: Dag Hammarskjbld Foundation, What Now - Another Development
(Development Dialogue, 1975), Uppsala, 1975.
5. Cf. R.H. Green, 'Basic Human Needs: A Conceptual Formulation
Toward Another Development,' IFDA Dossier #2, International Founda-
tion Alternatives, Nyon, 1977.
6. The correlation is even higher, it seems, for the successful operations!
7. At present the participation in frame setting exists albeit the component
resting on non-formal influence on officials and politicians seems at
least as critical as that of even indirectly elected worker or peasant
representatives. Arguably, the same is true of wages. It is demon-
strably not true of salaries nor of grower prices. Salary earners and
peasants are not involved in the process and do not comprehand how
decisions are taken nor are they satisfied that their interests have been
considered seriously or on the basis of adequate information.
8. This is independent of whether the goals are material. If the dominant
goal is spiritual salvation, theological professionals would appear to be
a highly efficient input. It is not entirely independent of whether there
is a working consensus among the professionals -- three architects
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arguing about minimum corridor widths once held up a Tanzania
secondary school project for months until the three interested bodies
decided to ignore all three and reach a "rule of thumb" compromise.
9. Economists and political economists are peculiarly guilty in this
regard, albeit doctors are often worse in insisting that nothing the
patient knows or feels is relevant to his "cure."
10. E.g., in the U.S.A. urban planning professionals can often ride
roughshod over participation in slum areas but not middle-class ones.
(The U.K. seems to have greated evenhandedness but in the wrong
direction.) In Dar es Salaam this is rather less true because political
participation by poor households can prevent "platonic social engineer-
ing. " What has not acheived to date is real participation--the unplanned
areas are not messed about and do receive some services but have little
positive interaction with urban planning professionals.
11. One can be cynical and term this noblesse oblige,
discriminating monopoly revenue maximisation. Especially at individ-
ual level this can be grossly unfair, e.g., mission hospital doctors in
Africa are in no sense income maximizers. Further, such cynicism if
acted on throws away what is often the only actually available source of
expert knowledge and advice to popular organisations.
12. This is true in some cases even in respect to most "security" profes-
sions. Populist and even non-capitalist officers are by no means
unknown.
13. Procedures at one level designed to block a process, e. go, tenant
evictions--are in another sense designed to serve the opposite process,
e.g., tenant security. Whether in any particular case they do so is a
different matter.
14. Until the early 1970's prosecutions were nearly impossible because the
law treated the "key money" payer as an accomplice and effectively re-
quired a second eye witness. Again a dubiously appropriate procedure
for protecting would be tenants whatever the general moral or social
issues surrounding offering bribes/paying up on extortion.
15. E.g., the Tanzania land acquisition legislation intended to deal with
securing hierarchy or public building sites provides for compensation
procedures. Land officials worked out rules of thumb adequate to
genuine long-term occupiers disturbed in such cases. But when these
laws and procedures have been applied to new planned urban areas
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they produce waves of brand new "phantom" occupiers who find being
bought out under these procedures very lucrative.
16. This is not to imply that a popular organisation may not or need not
have some members and some leaders from the managerial -profes-
sional -official -politician sub-classes. The distinction is between
groups basically of and basically led by workers and peasants and
groups basically of and/or led by others, e.g., the various interna-
tional networks for "Another Development" (or "Law in Development")
may be participatory, they may be in solidarity with popular organisa-
tions, they may have unique roles to play which popular organisations
cannot or can rarely play by themselves--but they are not, and cannot
be, popular organisations as the term is us here.
17. The same problem confronts non -specialist support groups, e. g., the
World Development Movement in the U.K. What besides reading about
the Third World and pressuring/protesting to U.K. leaders are their
members to do? In particular what are the members who are not pro-
fessional intellectuals nor in a position to contact many decision takers
or influencers directly to do? WDM admits quite openly that it has yet
to find a really satisfactory answer.
18. In the last two cases the organisations may well become shells or
frauds indistinguishable from phony "popular" organisations created by
the power structure. Ghana's Trade Union movement after the late
1950's went that route though it had earlier been radical or main-line
reformist and subsequently a legitimate within the system cluster of
popular organisations.
19. In fact willingness to hold officers accountable for violations of the laws
of war is by no means universal in principle and is very often honoured
in the breach in practice. What was unusual about the Mei Lai mass -
acre case was not that few officers were prosecuted or that the principal
defendant, Lt. Calley, eventually received a trivial sentence, but that a
well publicized trial with a conviction and a confirmed sentence took
place at all. Other security service accountability (prisons, police) is
often equally thin in practice and that of other officials may be in some
cases, e. g., doctors and engineers, local administrators in physically
or dommunication channel isolated areas because demands for action
can be blocked and disinformation mobilized relatively easily.
20. There is need for some self-discipline and/or some arbitral mech-
anism, e.g., a question to the Minister for Finance in Tanzania
wanted to know the exact number of price controlled goods, the exact
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results of the radical overhaul of indirect tax on each and the result of
recent and pending Price Commission decisions. As the answer to the
former, if it includes not only categories but also brands, sizes and
items covered under a category, mark-up limit provision is virtually
indeterminate but probably over 3,000 (2,500 in the categoric mark-
up case) a literally complete answer would have put the Treasury
analysis unit out of business for two weeks. A responsive answer us-
ing ten major sample items and broad general effects was given (and
apparently satisfied the questioner)--relatively easy because a similar
internal exercise had been done for guidance during the tax restructur-
ing exercise. In an earlier (by a decade) case repeated querying on the
impact of a ball bearing tariff increase on typical farm costs in which
the initial answer of "trivial" was rejected took half a week of the most
senior economic analyst's time and showed an average Sh. 6.0 for the
5,000 odd units probably using ball bearings or Sh. 0.015 for each farm
unit.
21. In practice this usually happens with a distinct lag and in a piecemeal
fashion. Both shortages of draftsmen and the lack of "legal conscious-
ness" of many decision takers and most popular organisations are con-
tributory factors.
22. Salaried lawyers--especially public sector ones--fairly evidently are
rarely prominent. If they are they presumably rapidly become inde-
pendent practitioners whether by choice or otherwise. The potential
exception would be legal service or corporation lawyers charged with
providing services to indigent or undefended clients and even here an
activist role by the salaried lawyers would not utually be tolerated for
very long.
23. If the formal court system is too costly, too complex and too crowded
to handle a wide array of "lesser" civil and criminal cases, an extra-
legal system may be tolerated, tacitly approved or even transformed
into a recognized adjunct of the official system, e.g., the handling of
cases of minor assault, theft, drunkenness of Party Cell or Ward
Leaders in Tanzania falls halfway between the last two.
24. A "class traitor" may or may not change classes, e.g., Chou En Lai
told Stalin that it was true he was from the mandarin and Stalin from
the peasant class but they had the fact of being traitors to their class
in common. Stalin clearly had left the peasant class, Chou was still a
mandarin but attempting to create a new mandarin (bureaucratic) class
consistent with socialism.
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25. There is a contradiction deeper than simple tension between authori-
tarian (not merely professional) and participatory elements within the
public sector, institutional and procedural structure. There are also
increasingly severe strains in respect to distribution because safe-
guarding the weakest social groups has required draconic sacrifices
from the professional and official/managerial sub -classes.
26. The present author is among those who would argue that it was. An
individual who believed that adequate levels of consciousness and of social
change only come through intense internal contradictions and struggles
(whether or not he sees their resolution as necessarily violent) would dis-
agree. He would perceive it as a recipe for friction and gravity to halt
and reverse forward movement and would argue that Tanzania's failure to
achieve more rapid and more complete transition to socialism is pre-
cisely because initial domestic contradictions were of relatively low inten-
sity and the leadership has chosen to act to reduce not to exacerbate (or
even in most cases focus attention in polemic terms) on them. This par-
ticular neo-Fanonist line of criticism is not necessarily blood-thirsty or
absurd. Contextually, however, it is a trifle hard to see how genuinely
antagonistic contradictions could have been "achieved" by a left leader-
ship, that workers and peasants would have sought that route, or that the
very fragile state and society could have faced very real external contra-
dictions with any degree of success (to date it has survived without U turns
or even any significant drift to the right, on balance au contraire) if it had
at the same time been riven by deliberately sought, d- ep and bitter internal
struggle.
27. The author does not feel competent to (nor directly involved enough to)
offer definite advice. He would, however, doubt the adequacy of a purely
main -line reformist strategy or indeed of one with no elements of direct
action/confrontation.
28. The author has grave reservations about Chief Buthelezi's tactics and
strategy and also about whether he is not too conservative and authori-
tarian in outlook for the people he seeks to lead. Certainly, Inkatha's
effect to date is problematic with some negative aspects (especially the
exacerbation of tensions between the Zulu Nation and other black South
Africans) and its future as an agent of radical reform unlikely to be very
effective. But these judgments may be wrong and to lump Chief Buthelezi
with Kaiser Mantazima or quasi-capitalist Uncle Tom's is both cheap
rhetoric and (as a present reality rather than a future danger) objectively
quite clearly inaccurate.
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29. That mistake can waste time in a context in which wasting time is wasting
lives. Certainly by 1960, at least, some former liberal party leaders
felt that their decade of efforts to block the growth of repression via the
legal process to gain time to build a cross-racial basis for non-violent
bourgeois democratic reconstruction had mystified them, created false
hopes and provided South Africa with an external smoke screen and facade
of democratic process and the rule of law.
30. Nothing is less participatory or accountable than the elite member who
claims to speak for "the masses" when he quite clearly does not present
the same concerns, goals, tactics or world view and justifies this by
claiming "the masses" are bemused by false consciousness and would
speak as he did if only they were able to understand. If he believes his
contention he should first test it against reality by observation and by
listening and then attempt to assist in/catalyse a "mass" based dialogue
which would (could) result in their achieving by and for themselves a new
level of consciousness.
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